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Abstract
This paper examines directed networks in which the payoﬀ of a player depends
on the total number links formed by her and the other players. After showing that
these networks with global spillovers may not always have Nash equilibria in pure
strategies, we introduce two additional properties for the payoﬀ function. The ﬁrst
called increasing (or decreasing) diﬀerence property states that player i’s payoﬀ
increases (decreases) as the number of links between the other n − 1 players in-
creases. The second condition called the strict smaller midpoint property imposes
a monotonicity restriction on the payoﬀ function. We show that pure strategy
Nash networks always exist under both conditions. The paper then characterizes
these Nash equilibria showing that symmetric networks play a crucial role.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85
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11 Introduction
This paper deals with directed networks with global spillovers. Directed networks
are of importance in situations where acquiring and possessing information plays
a key role. This can range from accessing a webpage to citing someone’s work.
In the context of an oligopolistic setup directed links may be viewed as the act of
gathering information about a rival ﬁrm (see for instance Cohen, Levinthal, 1990,
[3] and van Ryn, 2000, [8]). Moreover, in many networks situations the number of
links a player has, as well as the links of the other players, generate externalities
that determine payoﬀs. Such environments where the payoﬀ of a player depends
on the total number of links established by the other players are said to exhibit
global spillovers.
We can ask what structures of networks will be formed in such situations of di-
rected networks with global spillovers. To answer this question, we model the
network formation process as a non-cooperative game, and we look for the Nash
equilibria of this game. More precisely, we consider a set of ex-ante identical play-
ers who form directed links with other players in order to obtain their resources.
These links only allow for one-way ﬂow of information. Thus when player i estab-
lishes a link with player j, then i can obtain j’s resources but not the other way
round unless j also forms a link with i.
We ﬁrst show through an example that a payoﬀ function satisfying the global
spillovers property may not contain a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then, we
impose two restrictions on the payoﬀ function and show that a Nash equilibrium
always exists for each of these conditions. The ﬁrst of these is called the increasing
(decreasing) diﬀerences property. Decreasing diﬀerences states that the marginal
2payoﬀ of a player, hence the incentive of this player to set additional links, de-
creases with the total number of links formed by the other players, i.e exclusivity of
information matters for instance. Increasing diﬀerences on the other hand states
that marginal payoﬀs of a player increases when other players form more links,
i.e. where word-of-mouth type communication is more important for instance.
The second restriction on the payoﬀ function is a variation of discrete convex-
ity called the strict smaller midpoint property. This condition merely imposes a
monotonicity requirement on the payoﬀ function. Finally we characterize the the
Nash equilibria of the network formation game.
Our paper is in the vein of one-way ﬂow models introduced by (Bala, Goyal,
2000, [1]). It is most closely related to Goyal and Joshi (2006, [4]) who also
examine global spillovers in the context of networks. In terms of contributions
to the literature ours is the ﬁrst paper to examine such spillovers in a directed
network. Unlike Goyal and Joshi (2006, [4]), who use pws-equilibrium (a mixture
of Nash equilibrium and Jackson and Wolinsky’s pairwise stability), we rely solely
on Nash equilibrium. We discuss both existence as well as the architectures of the
Nash networks making the paper a complement to the existing literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the framework of
our model. Section 3 focuses on the existence a Nash equilibria. In section 4, we
characterize the equilibrium networks and section 5 summarizes our results.
2 Model Setup
Let N = {1,...,i,j, ... ,n}, with n ≥ 3, be a ﬁnite set of players. For any
i,j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 denotes that player i has formed a directed link with player j,
and gi,j = 0 implies that this link is absent. Hence, we denote by gi = (gi,1,...,
gi,i−1,0, gi,i+1 ...,gi,j,...,gi,n) the directed links vector of player i.
3A directed network g = {(gi,j)i∈N,j∈N} is a formal description of the directed
links that exist between the players. Let G denote the set of all directed networks
without loops (since we assume that a player i can not form a link with herself).
We assume that the link gi,j = 1 enables player i to access j’s information,
but not vice versa. In other words, ﬂow of resources in our model is one-way. Let
Ni(g) = {j | gi,j = 1} be the set of players j from whom i gets externalities with
ni(g) being the cardinal of Ni(g). Denote by n−i(g) =
P
j6=i nj(g) the number
of links in the network g excluding those links originating from player i. Let
δ(g) =
P
i∈N ni(g), be the total number of links formed in the network g.
We now deﬁne the main network architectures that are extensively used in
our model. A network denoted by gc is complete if for every pair of players i
and j, there is a link from i to j and there is a link from j to i. Similarly, g is
empty if no player has formed a link and we denote this by ge. A network g is a
k-all-or-nothing network if k players have established links with all other players
while n − k players have formed no link.
Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network obtained when all of player
i’s links are removed. Hence the network g can be written as g = g−i ⊕gi, where
⊕ indicates that g is formed by the union of links in gi and g−i. In what fol-
lows, the amount of resources that a player obtains depends on the number of
links she has formed, and the total number of links that other players form. Such
a formulation where the payoﬀs of players is a function of the total number of
links formed by the other players is called a network model with global spillovers.
In that case, the strategy of each player i can be summarized by the number of
links, ni(g), that player i forms. Likewise, the strategies play by other players
can be summarized by the number of links, n−i(g), that players j ∈ N \{i} form.
Deﬁne A = {0,...,n − 1} and B = {0,...,(n − 1)2}. The payoﬀ function of
each player i ∈ N is given by ui : Gi × G−i → I R, ui : (gi,g−i) 7→ ui(gi,g−i) =
4φi(ni(g),n−i(g)), with φi : A × B → I R,(ni(g),n−i(g)) 7→ φi(ni(g),n−i(g)).
The strategy gi is said to be a best response of player i to g−i if for all g0 such
that g−i = g0
−i, we have:
ui(gi,g−i) = φi(ni(g),n−i(g)) ≥ φi(ni(g0),n−i(g0)) = ui(g0
i,g0
−i),
for all g0
i ∈ Gi. The set of player i’s best responses to g−i is denoted by BRi(g−i).
Furthermore, a network g = (g1,...,gi,...,gn) is said to be a Nash network if
gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each i ∈ N.
We now deﬁne an ordering relation, º, on Gi and G−i. More precisely, we say
that gi º g0
i if and only if ni(g) ≥ ni(g0) and g−i º g0
−i if and only if n−i(g) ≥
n−i(g0). Therefore, we have mingi∈Gi{BRi(g−i)} = {gi ∈ BRi(g−i)|g0
i º gi,∀g0
i ∈
BRi(g−i)}. Lastly, we deﬁne ˆ min{BRi(g−i)} = {gi ∈ mingi∈Gi {BRi(g−i)} |gi,` =
1 for ` ∈ {1,...,ni(g)},gi,`0 = 0 for `0 ∈ {ni(g) + 1,...,n − 1}} which is clearly a
singleton.
Given that randomized strategies cannot be meaningfully interpreted in the
context of forming relationships, the network literature focuses only on pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria. The following example illustrates that a Nash network in pure
strategies does not always exist under a payoﬀ function exhibiting global spillovers.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3}. We deﬁne the following payoﬀ function for all
i ∈ N:
φi(2,1) > φi(1,0) > φi(0,0),
φi(x,y) < φi(0,0) for all (x,y) 6∈ {(2,1),(1,0)}.
It is obvious that for these payoﬀs a Nash network does not exist.
We now provide some deﬁnitions useful for studying the existence of Nash
networks.
5Deﬁnition 1 We say that two networks g and g0 are adjacent if there is a unique
player i ∈ N such that gi,j 6= g0
i,j for at least one player j 6= i and if for all players
k 6= i, gk,j = g0
k,j, for all j ∈ N.
An improving path is a sequence of adjacent networks that results when players
form or sever links based on payoﬀ strict improvement the new network oﬀers over
the current network. Each network in the sequence diﬀers from the previous one
by the links formed by one unique player.
Deﬁnition 2 Formally, an improving path from a network g to a network g0 is
a ﬁnite sequence of networks g1,...,gk, with g1 = g and gk = g0, such that the
two following conditions are veriﬁed :
1. g` and g`+1, are adjacent networks;
2. for the unique player, say player i, who has changed her links, we have
g`+1
i ∈ BRi(g`
−i) and g`
i 6∈ BRi(g`
−i), that is g`+1 is a network where i plays
a best response while g` is a network where i does not play a best response.
Moreover, if g1 = gk, then the improving path is called an improving cycle.
It is obvious that a network g is a Nash network if and only if it has no improving
path emanating from it.
In the two following sections, we will present two conditions which make the
existence of Nash networks possible.
3 Existence of Nash networks
We have already seen that Nash networks in pure strategies do not always exist in
one-way ﬂow models with spillovers. Hence it is necessary to identify properties
6that will allow for the existence of these networks. Two properties satisfy this
condition. The ﬁrst one is the increasing (or decreasing) diﬀerences property. The
second one is the discrete convexity property.
3.1 The increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences property
We begin with the increasing (or decreasing) diﬀerences property and show that
a Nash network always exists when the payoﬀ function satisﬁes this property.
Deﬁnition 3 The function φi has strictly increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in
its two arguments (ni(g),n−i(g)) if φi(ni(g),n−i(g))−φi(ni(g),n−i(g0)) is strictly
increasing (decreasing) in ni(g) for all n−i(g) > n−i(g0). (See Vives, 1999, [9]).
It is clear that gi ≥ g0
i (gi ≤ g0
i) implies ni(g) ≥ ni(g0) (ni(g) ≤ ni(g0)) and
g−i ≥ g0
−i (g−i ≤ g0
−i) implies n−i(g) ≥ n−i(g0) (n−i(g) ≤ n−i(g0)). Therefore,
if φi admits strictly increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences then ui admits strictly
increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences.
In other words, we say that a payoﬀ function satisﬁes the increasing (or de-
creasing) diﬀerences property when the marginal payoﬀ function of a player i from
establishing links is increasing (decreasing) in the number of links formed by the
other players. It is easy to check that payoﬀ function in example 1 does not satisfy
any of these two properties. The idea behind the increasing diﬀerences property
is that the value of information possessed by a player increases as other players
form more links, while decreasing diﬀerences says that it decreases. Hence the de-
creasing diﬀerence property is more useful for instance when the exclusivity of the
information matters. Increasing diﬀerences are appropriate for situations where
awareness and popularity matters, i.e, marketing or when word-of-communication
is crucial. Finally, note that these properties can be used even if the arguments
belong to a discrete space. We now show that this property is a suﬃcient con-
7dition to obtain the existence of Nash networks. To show this result we use two
results due to Zhou (1994, [11]) and Kukushkin (1994, [5]). We need the following
deﬁnitions to present these results.
Deﬁnition 4 (Topkis 1998, [6]) If X and T are sets, St is a subset of X for each
t in T, and xt is in St, then the function xt from T into X is a selection from St.
If X and T are partially ordered sets, St is a subset of X for each t in T, and xt
is a selection from St that is an increasing (decreasing) function of t from T into
X, then xt is an increasing (decreasing) selection.
Deﬁnition 5 Zhou (1994, [11]) A correspondence f is ascending if, for any x ≥
y, any s ∈ f(x), and any t ∈ f(y), it is true that max{s,t} ∈ f(x) and min{s,t} ∈
f(y).
The two theorems that we will use to prove the existence of Nash networks whe
nthe payoﬀ function satisﬁes the increasing (or decreasing) diﬀerences property
are the following.
Theorem 1 (adapted from Zhou 1994, [11]). Suppose An = {0,..,n − 1}n, f :
An → An, a 7→ f(a) is a correspondence from An to An, and E is the set of ﬁxed
points of f. If f is ascending in a, then E is non empty.
Theorem 2 (adapted from Kukushkin 1994, [5]). Let fi :
Q
j∈N\{i} A → A be
a correspondence allowing a decreasing single-valued selection. Then, the set of
ﬁxed points is nonempty.
Proposition 1 In a one-way ﬂow model with global spillovers and increasing (or
decreasing) diﬀerences, a Nash network in pure strategies always exists.
Proof Firstly, it is obvious that if the function φ satisﬁes the increasing diﬀerences
property, then the best response correspondence is ascending. So, our model
8satisﬁes the assumption of theorem 1 and there exists a Nash network.
Secondly, if the function φ satisﬁes the decreasing diﬀerences property, then ˆ min
{BRi(g−i)} is a decreasing single valued selection. Therefore, our model satisﬁes
the assumption of theorem 2 and there exists a Nash network. ¤
The next example illustrates the importance of this result in a model where
ﬁrms form links before competing in a Cournot oligopoly.
Example 2 Cost reducing intelligence activities in oligopoly.1 Consider an ho-
mogeneous product Cournot Oligopoly consisting of n ex ante symmetric ﬁrms
who face the linear inverse demand function p = α −
P
i∈N qi, α > 0. The ﬁrms
initially have zero ﬁxed costs and identical constant returns-to-scale cost functions.
Establishing a link lowers marginal costs in a linear way: Ci(g) = γ0 − γni(g),
where γ0 is a positive parameter representing a ﬁrm i’s marginal cost if it has no
link. Given any network g, the Cournot equilibrium output can be written as:
qi(g) =
(α − γ0) + nγni(g) − γn−i(g)
(n + 1)
,i ∈ N.
The Cournot proﬁts for ﬁrm i ∈ N are given by φi(ni(g),n−i(g)) = (qi(g))
2 −
fni(g), where f is the cost of establishing a link. Let us deﬁne g0 in which there
exists a ﬁrm j such that g0
−j = g−j and
P
k6=j gj,k =
P
k6=j g0
j,k + 1. We get:
∆φi = φi(ni(g),n−i(g)) − φi(ni(g0),n−i(g0))
= −
γ (2γnni(g) − 2γn−i(g) − γ + 2(α − γ0))
(n + 1)
2
and ∆φi decreases with ni(g). The proﬁt function satisﬁes decreasing diﬀerences.
Hence, by proposition 1, a Nash network always exists.
1This model is taken from Billand and Bravard (2004, [2]).
93.2 The discrete convexity property
In this section we introduce another condition that allows for the existence of pure
strategy Nash networks: the discrete convexity property. We begin by deﬁning a
convexity notion on which it is based.
Deﬁnition 6 A function f : R → R satisﬁes strict midpoint convexity if for any
x,y ∈ R,
f
µ
x + y
2
¶
<
f(x) + f(y)
2
.
Here we use a similar property for a function deﬁned on the discrete space A,
inspired by Ui (2005, [7]).2 Let |x| = max{−x,x}.
Deﬁnition 7 We say that a function f : A → R satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property if, for any x,y,z ∈ A, with |x−y| = 2, and |z−x| = |z−y| = 1,
there exists t ∈ (0,1), such that,
f(z) < tf(x) + (1 − t)f(y).
Note that, in deﬁning the strict smaller midpoint property, we postulate that the
midpoint of x,y ∈ A is z ∈ A. We say that a function f : A → I R is discretely
convex if for all x,y ∈ A and for all α ∈ (0,1)
αf(x) + (1 − α)f(y) > min
ξ∈N(z)
f(ξ),
where N(z) = {ξ ∈ A : |ξ−z| < 1}, z = αx+(1−α)y.3 It is easy to check that in
our context if f is discretely convex, then it satisﬁes the smaller midpoint property
(it is enough to set that α = 1/2 and y = x + 2). Moreover, it is straightforward
2Ui (2005, [7]) deals with discrete concavity and provides a more general deﬁnition of larger midpoint
property.
3This deﬁnition is a slight variation of the deﬁnition given by Yuceer ([10], 2002) in our context.
10that in our context, if a function is monotonic, then it satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property.
We assume that for all i ∈ N, the function φi satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property in its ﬁrst argument. That is, for any x ∈ A, y ∈ A, z ∈
{1,...,n−2}, with |x−y| = 2, and |z −x| = |z −y| = 1, and for all w ∈ B, there
exists t ∈ (0,1) such that:
φi(z,w) < tφi(x,w) + (1 − t)φi(y,w),∀i ∈ N.
We assume that this function is the same for all i ∈ N allowing us to drop the
subscript in the function φ. This assumption is important to obtain results about
existence of Nash networks. We can write this as:
φ(z,w) < tφ(x,w) + (1 − t)φ(y,w). (1)
Next we provide some results about functions that satisfy the strict smaller mid-
point property.
Lemma 1 A function φ : A×B → R satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property
in its ﬁrst argument if and only if, for any z ∈ {1,...,n−2} and for any w ∈ B,
with |x − z| = |z − y| = 1, x 6= y,
φ(z,w) < max{φ(x,w),φ(y,w)} (2)
We omit the proof since it is straightforward. Observe that this property is
similar to quasiconvexity and a lot of payoﬀ functions can satisfy this property.
For instance, if the payoﬀ function is strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing with
the number of links formed by player i (given the number of links set by other
players), then it satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property. Likewise, if the
payoﬀ function is such that the marginal payoﬀ of player i is increasing with the
number of links that player i forms, then it satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint
11property. Furthermore, some payoﬀ functions such that the marginal payoﬀ of
player i is decreasing with the number of links satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint
property.
Example 3 Let φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) = (ni(g))0.5 + n−i(g) be the payoﬀ function.
It is obvious that the marginal payoﬀ of player i is decreasing with the number
of links formed by player i. However, this function satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property since it is monotone.
We now present an economic application to illustrate the scope of this class of
functions.
Example 4 Provision of a pure public good.4 There are n players, each of whom
is deciding on a level of output, xi, to produce a pure public good. Given each
player’s output, the utility of player i is:
φ(xi,x−i) = xi +
X
j∈N\{i}
xj.
A link formed by player i with player j allows the former to obtain knowledge
about the production of the public good. In any network g, the cost of producing
output xi is given by:
pi(xi,g) =
x2
i
2ηi(g)
,
where we set ηi(g) = ni(g) + 1. Given a network g, each player i will choose
output to maximize utility net of production costs. This yields an optimal output
of xi(g) = ηi(g). Therefore, the reduced form gross payoﬀ of player i is:
1
2
ηi(g) +
X
j∈N\{i}
ηj(g).
4This is a modiﬁcation of the example 4.1 given by Goyal and Joshi (2006, [4]).
12We assume that the cost of setting links is γ
p
ni(g), γ > 0, so the payoﬀ of player
i is:
φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) = n + ni(g) +
X
j∈N\{i}
nj(g) − γ
p
ni(g).
It is clear that this payoﬀ function satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property.
The next two lemmas which follow from Lemma 1 allow us to order the payoﬀs
of a player in terms of the number of links she establishes.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the function φ : A × B → R satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property in its ﬁrst argument. If φ(n−1,w) ≤ φ(n−2,w) for all w ∈ B,
then φ(z,w) > φ(z + 1,w) for all z ∈ {0,...,n − 3}.
Proof Assume that φ(n − 1,w) ≤ u(n − 2,w) for all w ∈ B. By Lemma 1,
we know that φ(n − 2,w) < max{φ(n − 3,w),φ(n − 1,w)}. Therefore it follows
that φ(n − 2,w) < φ(n − 3,w). Next suppose that there exists k ∈ {1,...,n − 3}
such that φ(k,w) > φ(k + 1,w) for all w ∈ B. Then, by Lemma 1, we have
φ(k,w) < φ(k − 1,w). ¤
The next lemma is a consequence of the monotonicity property of payoﬀ func-
tions that satisfy the strict smaller midpoint property.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the function φ : A × B → R satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property in its ﬁrst argument. Then, for any w ∈ B, we have
max{φ(0,w),φ(n − 1,w)} > φ(z,w),∀z ∈ {1,...,n − 2}.
Proof By Lemma 2 we know that if φ(n − 1,w) ≤ φ(n − 2,w), then φ(z,w) <
φ(z − 1,w), for all z ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. In that case, we have φ(0,w) > φ(z,w) for
all z ∈ {1,...,n−1}. Also, assume that φ(n−1,w) > φ(n−2,w). There are now
two cases.
131. Suppose φ(0,w) < φ(1,w). Then by Lemma 1, φ(n − 1,w) > φ(z,w) for all
z ∈ {1,...,n − 2}.
2. Suppose φ(0,w) ≥ φ(1,w) for all w ∈ B. Then, we show that there exists
a unique d ∈ {2,...,n − 2} such that φ(d,w) < φ(d − 1,w), and φ(d,w) <
φ(d + 1,w).
• If d does not exist, then we know that φ(·,w) is decreasing in its ﬁrst
argument and we have a contradiction since φ(n − 1,w) > φ(n − 2,w).
• Suppose that there exist d and d0, d 6= d0, such that φ(d,w) < φ(d−1,w),
φ(d,w) < φ(d+1,w) and φ(d0,w) < φ(d0−1,w), φ(d0,w) < φ(d0+1,w).
Without loss of generality let d0 > d. Since φ(d,w) < φ(d+1,w), we have
φ(d+1,w) < φ(d+2,w) and by induction φ(d+k,w) < φ(d+k+1,w)
for all k ∈ {1,...,n − d − 2} and w ∈ B. Hence, there does not exist
d0 ∈ {d + 2,...,n − 2} such that φ(d0,w) < φ(d0 − 1,w), φ(d0,w) <
φ(d0 + 1,w) which yields a contradiction.
Hence, for all w ∈ B and for all z ∈ {1,...,d}, we have φ(0,w) > φ(z,w),
and for all z ∈ {d,...,n − 2}, we have φ(n − 1,w) > φ(z,w). This gives us
the desired conclusion.
¤
We are now ready to examine the existence question under the discrete con-
vexity property. To simplify the notation, let gi = (0,0,...,0) = 0 and gi =
(1,1,..,1) = n − 1, two strategies for player i ∈ N.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the payoﬀ function satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint
property. Then, the best response of each player i ∈ N is either 0 or n − 1.
Proof To obtain a contradiction, assume that there exist a player i ∈ N and
a network g ∈ G such that BRi(g) 6∈ {0,n − 1}. Then, there exists g ∈ G
14such that ni(g) ∈ {2,...,n − 2}, n−i(g) ∈ B, φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) ≥ φ(0,n−i(g))
and φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) ≥ φ(n − 1,n−i(g)). By Lemma 3, we have for any ni(g) ∈
{2,...,n − 2},
max{φ(0,n−i(g)),φ(n − 1,n−i(g))} > φ(ni(g),n−i(g)),∀n−i(g) ∈ B,
which is a contradiction. ¤
Proposition 2 Suppose that the payoﬀ function satisﬁes the strict smaller mid-
point property. Then the one-way ﬂow model with global spillovers always contains
a Nash network in pure strategies.
Proof We start from the empty network ge, and show that we can reach a Nash
network. In other words, there is no improving cycle originating from the empty
network. If there is no improving path from ge, we are done. Otherwise, there
exists a player, say i1, such that 0 6∈ BRi1(ge
−i1). Hence, by Lemma 4, we have,
BRi1(ge
−i1) = n − 1. Let g1 be the network in which no player has formed links
except player i1 who has formed n − 1 links. Either g1 is a Nash network and we
are done, or there is a player say i2 such that 0 6∈ BRi2(g1
−i2). In the latter case, by
lemma 4, we have BRi2(g1
−i2) = n−1. Let g2 be the network in which no player
has formed links except players i1 and i2 who have formed n−1 links. We observe
that player i1 has no incentive to modify her strategy in g2. Indeed, we have
BRi = BRj for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, and by construction g2
−i1 = g2
−i2. Therefore,
if BRi2(g1
−i2) = n − 1, then BRi1(g2
−i1) = n − 1. More generally, we deﬁne
gk the network in which no player has formed links except players i1,i2,...,ik
who have formed n − 1 links and BRi(gk
−i) = n − 1 for all i ∈ {i1,...,ik}.
Either gk is a Nash network and we are done, or there exists a player, say ik+1,
such that 0 6∈ BRik+1(gk
−ik+1). By Lemma 4, BRik+1(gk
−ik+1) = n − 1. Let
gk+1 be the network in which no player has formed links except players i`, with
15` ∈ {1,...,k +1} who has formed n−1 links. We observe that players i` have no
incentive to modify their strategy in gk+1 since BRi(·) = BRj(·) for all j,i ∈ N
and gk+1
−i = gk+1
−ik for all i ∈ {i1,...,ik}.
Hence, there does not exist any improving cycle starting from ge and, since
the set of players N is ﬁnite, a Nash network exists. ¤
4 Characterization of Nash Networks
In this section we provide a characterization of Nash networks. We begin with a
necessary deﬁnition. A symmetric network g is a network in which all players form
the same number of links, i.e. for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N, we have ni(g) = nj(g).5
Since our game is symmetric, we know from standard results (see for instance
Vives, [9] Corollary p. 41) that a Nash symmetric network exists. This allows us
to prove the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the payoﬀ function has strictly increasing diﬀerences
in its two arguments. Every Nash network is a symmetric network. Moreover,
there exists a function φ such that any symmetric network g is Nash.
Proof Suppose a non empty and non symmetric network g. We must show that
g is not an equilibrium network. To introduce a contradiction, suppose that g is a
Nash network. Since g is a non empty and non symmetric network there are player
i and player j such that Ni(g) 6= Nj(g). Without loss of generality, we assume that
ni(g) ≥ nj(g). It follows that we have n−i(g) ≤ n−j(g). Moreover, since g is a
Nash network φ(ni(g),n−i(g))−φ(nj,n−i(g)) ≥ 0 since ni(g) is a best response for
player i, and φ(nj(g),n−j(g))−φ(ni(g),n−j(g)) ≥ 0 since nj(g) is a best response
for player j. But since φ satisﬁes the increasing diﬀerences property, we have:
5In the graph theory literature such a network is also called a regular graph.
16φ(ni(g),n−j(g)) − φ(nj(g),n−j(g)) > φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) − φ(nj(g),n−i(g)) ≥ 0. It
follows that g is not a Nash network. This completes the proof of the ﬁrst part of
the proposition.
For the second part of the proposition, let g be a symmetric network, with ni(g) =
x for all i. It is suﬃcient to assume that φ satisﬁes the increasing diﬀerence
property and φ(x,(n − 1)x) is the maximum of φ. ¤
Remark. Note that it is not possible to obtain interesting characterization
results under the decreasing diﬀerences property. Indeed, it is easy to see that
under this condition all networks can be supported as Nash equilibria.
We now move on to the strict smaller midpoint property.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the payoﬀ function satisﬁes the strict smaller mid-
point property. The Nash networks are k-all-or-nothing networks.
Proof We know by Lemma 4 that in a Nash network each player forms either 0
or n − 1 links. ¤
Next, for the sake of illustration we show what happens when we impose the
increasing (or decreasing) diﬀerences and strict smaller midpoint properties simul-
taneously on the payoﬀ function. More precisely, we provide suﬃcient conditions
for the two polar cases, the empty and the complete networks, to be Nash networks
when φ satisﬁes these two properties.
Proposition 5 Suppose φ has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in its two arguments
and satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property.
1. The complete network is the unique Nash network if and only if φ
¡
n − 1,(n − 1)2¢
> φ
¡
0,(n − 1)2¢
.
2. The empty network is a Nash network if φ(0,0) > φ(n − 1,0).
17Proof Since the second part of the proposition is straightforward, we only
prove the ﬁrst part. First, it is obvious that if the complete network is a Nash
network, then φ
¡
n − 1,(n − 1)2¢
> φ
¡
0,(n − 1)2¢
. Second, we show that if
φ
¡
n − 1,(n − 1)2¢
> φ
¡
0,(n − 1)2¢
then the complete network is the unique Nash
network. Indeed, assume that there is a non complete network g∗ which is a Nash
network. We have φ(ni(g∗),n−i(g∗)) ≥ φ(ni(g),n−i(g∗)), for all g ∈ G and for
all i ∈ N. By decreasing diﬀerence property, we have:
φ(n − 1,(n − 1)2¢
> φ(0,(n − 1)2¢
⇒ φ(n − 1,n−i(g)
¢
> φ(0,n−i(g)
¢
,
for all n−i(g) ∈ {0,...,(n−1)2−1}. By Lemma 4, and the strict smaller midpoint
property, we have:
φ(n − 1,n−i(g)) > φ(0,n−i(g)) ⇒ φ(n − 1,n−i(g)) > φ(ni(g),n−i(g)),
for all ni(g) ∈ {0,...,n − 2}. This tells us that each player i always has an
incentive to form n − 1 links in g∗. Hence, g∗ cannot be a Nash network which
gives us the necessary contradiction. ¤
Corollary 1 Suppose φ has strictly increasing diﬀerences in its two arguments
and satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property.
1. The complete network is a Nash network if φ
¡
n − 1,(n − 1)2¢
> φ
¡
0,(n − 1)2¢
.
2. The empty network is the unique Nash network if and only if φ(0,0) >
φ(n − 1,0).
Example 5 Consider again the framework described in example 2. Let g0 be
the network such that g0
−i = g−i and ni(g) = ni(g0) + 1 (g is supposed to be a
non empty network) and let g00 be the network such that g00
−i = g−i and ni(g) =
ni(g00) − 1. We show that the proﬁt function satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint
18property, that is φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) < max{φ(ni(g0),n−i(g0)),φ(ni(g00),n−i(g00))}.
To obtain a contradiction, assume that φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) ≥ max{φ(ni(g0),n−i(g0)),
φ(ni(g00),n−i(g00))}. Then,
φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) − φ(ni(g0),n−i(g0)) ≥ 0
φ(ni(g00),n−i(g00)) − φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) ≤ 0
The two above inequalities give us:
2φ(ni(g),n−i(g)) − φ(ni(g0),n−i(g0)) − φ(ni(g00),n−i(g00)) < 0,
which is a contradiction.
Since φ has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in its two arguments and satis-
ﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property, we can conclude, by proposition 4,
that Nash networks are k-all-or-nothing networks. Moreover, by proposition 5,
we know that the complete network is the unique Nash network if and only if
φ(n − 1,(n − 1)2¢
> φ(0,(n − 1)2¢
and the empty network is a Nash network if
φ(0,0) > φ(n − 1,0).
5 Conclusion
This paper examines directed networks where the payoﬀ of a player depends on
how many links she has formed as well as the number of links formed by the
other players. Such networks provide a good way of modeling situations where
information acquisition matters. After showing that these networks with global
spillovers may not always have Nash equilibria in pure strategies, we introduce
two additional properties for the payoﬀ function. The ﬁrst one, called increasing
(or decreasing) diﬀerence property, states that player i’s marginal payoﬀ increases
(decreases) as the number of links between the other n − 1 players increases.
19The second property called the strict smaller midpoint property is deﬁned on a
discrete space. It is a fairly weak property since it only imposes the restriction of
monotonicity on the payoﬀ function. We show that pure strategy Nash networks
always exist under both conditions. The paper then proceeds to characterize these
Nash equilibria showing that symmetric networks play a crucial role in this setting.
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